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EXPERT WITNESSES, RATIONAL CHOICE 
AND THE SEARCH FOR INTENT* 
J. Morgan Kousser** 
Students of the individual personality have been serving as ex-
pert witnesses since at least the seventeenth century, when Sir 
Thomas Browne assured an English jury that witches existed and 
that, in his opinion, the defendants in the instant case were, indeed, 
witches. Historians, psychologists, anthropologists, and sociologists 
only took on a like duty in the 1940s and 1950s with the prepara-
tion of the school segregation cases. I In Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion, the Supreme Court and the litigants were concerned with the 
question of intent in two very different ways: they asked historians 
whether the framers of the fourteenth amendment had meant to ban 
racial segregation in schools or not; and they asked other social 
scientists, in effect, whether segregation was so harmful to black 
people that a discriminatory motive could be inferred.2 
In the 1970s and 1980s, the discussion of what became known 
as de facto and de jure school segregation turned on the question of 
motivation, as did those of the legality of various housing laws and 
employment practices.3 This stream of decisions perhaps reached 
• Earlier versions of this paper were delivered at Ohio State University and Caltech. 
I want to thank Michael Les Benedict, Alan Donagan, Allan Schwartz, and especially R. 
Douglas Rivers for helpful comments. 
•• Professor of History and Social Science, California Institute of Technology. 
l. The (Sir Thomas) Browne case is recounted in Garfinkel, Social Science Evidence 
and the School Segregation Cases, 21 J. POL 37, 46-47 (1959). The literature on the use of 
social scientists and historians as expert witnesses is wider than it is deep, but for convenient 
introductions and references, see B. LEVIN & W. HAWLEY, THE COURTS, SociAL SciENCE, 
AND ScHOOL DESEGREGATION (1977); Bourgeois, The Role of the Historian in the Litigation 
Process, 67 CANADIAN HIST. REv. 195 (1986); Clark, The Social Scientist as an Expen Wit-
ness in Civil Rights Litigation, 1 Soc. PROBS. 5 (1953); Rosen, The Anthropologist as Expen 
Witness, 79 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 555 (1977); P. McCrary & J. Hebert, Keeping the Courts 
Honest: Expert Witnesses in Voting Rights and School Desegregation Cases (1986) (unpub-
lished paper delivered at Southern Historical Association Convention). 
2. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See, e.g., Rosen, supro note 1, 
at 557-62, and references cited therein. 
3. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 
(1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); L. TRIBE, THE CoNSTITUTIONAL PRo-
TECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS: LIMITS ON GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY 1028-32 
(1978); Binion, "Intent" and Equal Protection: A Reconsideration, 1983 SuP. Cr. REv. 397, 
398-403; Sellers, The lmpoct of Intent on Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 84 DICKINSON L. 
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its high water mark in the 1980 voting rights case of Mobile v. 
Bolden, which brought historical expert witness testimony to the 
fore again.4 In his plurality opinion in Bolden, Justice Stewart ruled 
that it was not enough to show that the at-large election feature of 
the Mobile City Commission had the effect of discriminating 
against blacks. Instead, it was necessary to demonstrate that the 
creators of the arrangement had adopted it with an intent to dis-
criminate. For the next two years, debates over the renewal of the 
Voting Rights Act centered on whether an effect standard should 
replace what Stewart believed was the existing intent standard.s 
Likewise, issues of intent were also central to the great 
brouhaha among historians in 1986 over the testimony of Professors 
Rosalind Rosenberg and Alice Kessler-Harris in the Sears sex dis-
crimination case. 6 Rosenberg was asked to testify on the question 
of whether the apparent pattern of sex discrimination shown by em-
ployment statistics proved that Sears intended to discriminate 
against women in commission sales hires or whether women's alleg-
edly different motives in seeking employment could explain the sta-
tistical results away. The EEOC employed Kessler-Harris to 
criticize Rosenberg's account of women's purposes. In the ensuing 
extra-judicial controversy, each of the combatants attacked the 
other's motives in testifying as she did. Moreover, the emerging 
strategy of the defendants in both voting rights and affirmative ac-
tion litigation has concentrated on the use of statistics to prove or 
disprove intent. 1 
Determining the intent of Congress or other policymaking bod-
REv. 363 (1980); Simon, Racially Prejudiced Governmental Actions: A Motivation Theory of 
the Constitutional Ban Against Racial Discrimination, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1041 (1978). 
4. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980). In Brown, historians had not actually 
testified, but had served as consultants to the NAACP, being asked to supply evidence to 
support that organization's contention that the fourteenth amendment was meant to ban 
school segregation. The responsibilities of private advisers and those who testify under oath 
are quite different. 
5. See, e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986); S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 
2d Sess. 2 (1982). 
6. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has decided the case, upholding 
the decision of the district court. In a 2-1 vote, Judges Wood and Eschbach made up the 
majority while Judge Cudahy filed a vigorous dissent. The court denied rehearing en bane on 
March 15, 1988. EEOC v. Sears. Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988). On the 
constroversy in the historical profession, see Wiener, Women Fall One Step Back in Sears 
Case, IN THESE TIMES, July 9-22, 1986; Wiener, Women's History on Trial, 241 THE NATION 
61 (Sept. 7, 1985); Winkler, 2 Scholars' Conflict in Sears Sex-Bias Case Sets Off War in Wo-
men's History, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER Eouc., Feb. 5, 1986; Women's History and EEOC v. 
Sears, Roebuck and Co., NEW PERSPECTIVES, Summer 1986, at 21. 
7. For introductions to the issues involved in using statistics in employment discrimi-
nation cases, see Boardman & Vining, The Role of Probative Statistics in Employment Dis-
cn"mination Cases, 46 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 189 (1983); Shoben, The Use of Statistics to 
Prove Intentional Employment Discrimination, 46 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 219 (1983). 
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ies continues to be crucial in courts as well as in other forums. 
Weber, the affirmative action case, turned on the legislative history 
of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Acts. Whether the framers of 
the 1866 and 1870 Civil Rights Acts meant to protect whites of 
various non-British ethnic and nationality groups was crucial in two 
1987 Supreme Court cases.s Two major confrontations between 
Congress and the Reagan administration have involved intent: Did 
the 1972 SALT I Treaty prohibit tests of beam weapons or other 
technologically advanced ballistic missile defense system compo-
nents outside the laboratory?9 Did the Boland Amendment pro-
hibit the president and employees of the National Security Council 
from helping to provide military assistance to those seeking to over-
throw the Nicaraguan government during 1985? Finally, in a series 
of nineteenth and early twentieth-century commerce clause cases, 
and perhaps most memorably in the 1952 Steel Seizure Case, court 
decisions depended on judges' interpretations of the reasons why 
Congress/ailed to pass laws. However difficult it may be to discern 
the motives for inaction, the problem underlines the importance of 
discovering intent in statutory and constitutional law .10 
Although they continually attribute motives to their subjects, 
historians have published very little on the concept of intention. 
Legal scholars have expressed themselves more systematically, dis-
tinguishing three varieties of motives: the subjective intentions of 
individuals, which are evidenced by what people say they meant to 
do and why they meant to do it; foreseeability, or the consequences 
8. St. Francis College v. AI-Khazraji, 107 S. Ct. 2022 (1987); Shaare Tefila Congrega-
tion v. Cobb, 107 S. Ct. 2019 (1987); United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 
(1979). 
9. SeeR. GARTHOFF, POLICY VERSUS THE LAW: THE REINTERPRETATION OF THE 
ABM TREATY (1987) (pamphlet published by the Brookings Institution); Chayes & Chayes, 
Testing and Development of "Exotic" Systems Under the ABM Treaty: The Great Reinterpre-
tation Caper, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1956 (1986); Sofaer, The ABM Treaty and The Strategic 
Defense Initiative, 99 HARV. L. REv. 1972 (1986). 
10. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). Laurence H. 
Tribe argues persuasively that courts must interpret legislative and constitutional silence in L. 
TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 29-44 (1985). For a contrary argument, seeR. DICKER-
SON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 181-82 (1975). One might 
begin systematic thinking about how to interpret silence by distinguishing between active and 
inactive silence. The former is more probative, because the legislature is known to have been 
aware of a possible action and refused to take it-e.g., refused to prohibit local governments 
from regulating ship pilots. The passivity of a legislature that is not known to have consid-
ered a particular provision obviously provides courts with less guidance. Even in the first 
case, however, the intentions of the body may be subject to differing interpretations. For 
example, in 1875, the House turned down amendments to that year's Civil Rights Act that 
would have allowed school segregation and that would have required at least equal, even if 
separate schools. Supporters of integration apparently preferred not to enshrine segregation, 
even if it meant failing to mandate equal racial expenditures, equal school buildings, equal 
term lengths, etc. 
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that "objective" observers think could reasonably have been ex-
pected to follow from a particular behavior; and institutional inten-
tion, or the effect of a sum of a series of decisions by different 
officials. 11 
In this article, I shall argue that historians, political scientists, 
and judges unconsciously do employ all three notions of intent, and 
that none of the three should be discarded. To rely wholly on direct 
expressions of people's thoughts is to undermine a proper skepti-
cism about misrepresentations, and, in the many instances in which 
there are few or no statements at all, to risk abandoning the search 
for intent altogether. To concentrate exclusively on foreseeability is 
to invite nonterminating disputes between observers who differ on 
what various actors should have expected, as well as to disregard 
more straightforward evidence of motives. Finally, institutions do 
not act, in the simple way that vectors do in physics. Institutional 
intent is often a useful conceit, but it may, like other figures of 
speech, embellish rather than clarify. The inevitable intermixture of 
all three notions of intent and the difficulties and advantages of each 
will be illustrated through an examination of these paradigmatic in-
stances: statistical cases about differential treatment, laws, and a 
general constitutional provision, the fourteenth amendment. 
I 
Even when white male Americans have openly admitted their 
desires to treat others differently, they have usually disavowed any 
hostile purposes. When they excluded blacks from common or 
"white" schools in the 1840s, for instance, the members of the Bos-
ton School Committee claimed that they were acting "in the best 
interests" of blacks. Similarly, southern whites and men every-
where purported to be protecting Afro-Americans and women by 
denying them the vote. It has never been easy to find sworn, public 
expressions of ethnic or gender discrimination that would satisfy an 
antipathetic judge.12 As a consequence, both jurists and historians 
have generally turned to circumstantial evidence of intent, which 
has always included evidence drawn from effects. 
It is misleading to mark too bright a line between "intent" and 
"effect," or "differential treatment" and "adverse impact." Evi-
11. Note, Reading the Mind of the School Boord: Segregative Intent and the De Facto/ 
De Jure Distinction, 86 YALE L.J. 317 (1976) [hereinafter Note, Segregative Intent]. 
12. J. KOUSSER, DEAD END: THE DEVELOPMENT OF NINETEENTH-CENTURY Lm-
GATION ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN ScHOOLS (1986) [hereinafter J. KOUSSER, DEAD 
END); Kousser, "The Supremacy of Equal Rights": The Struggle Against Racial Discn'mina-
tion in Antebellum Massachusetts and the Foundations of the Fourteenth Amendment Nw. 
U.L. REv. (forthcoming). 
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dence that the goals of certain policies were impermissible has al-
most always been a matter of inference, rather than of direct 
statement.I3 Thus, even where nineteenth-century judges ruled 
school segregation constitutional, they still gauged the motives of 
school boards by requiring that the education offered blacks had to 
be "substantially equal" to that given whites.I4 Those effects were 
often judged by evidence which was at least in principle quantifi-
able, such as per capita appropriations, teachers' credentials, the 
quality of school buildings, the distance children had to walk to 
school, and so on. There is nothing new in using statistics about 
effects to judge whether discrimination has taken place. 
No reasonable person would expect Sears executives or south-
em legislators or city fathers to admit on the record that they 
intended to promote sex or race discrimination. Not even the dis-
franchisers of the late nineteenth century wrote race explicitly into 
their qualifications. Instead, they skillfully found correlates of 
race-literacy, property, conviction for such crimes as petty theft or 
miscegenation-and debarred people with those traits, maintaining 
that they wanted educated, honest electors who had a "stake in so-
ciety." They then left it to minor administrators to carry out their 
actual and obvious purposes.ls Similarly, present-day employers 
claim that they want only an aggressive, experienced, unreservedly 
dedicated work force, and framers of at-large election schemes de-
sire cosmopolitan, rather than locally oriented commissioners, 
councilmen, or school board members. 
The correlation gambit is also used when their practices are 
challenged in court. The strategy is to find correlates of race or 
gender and then to use them as explanatory variables, or if they 
cannot be measured, as explanations in principle. Past discrimina-
tion thus becomes an excuse for present and future discrimination. 
If Sears and other employers rarely hired women to sell consumer 
durables before 1973, it is not difficult to see why they had such 
trouble finding experienced women for such lines after that date. 
Throw in "experience" on the right-hand side of a regression equa-
tion, and the likelihood of finding a statistically significant effect for 
gender is reduced.16 Likewise, individual Latinos and southern 
13. Boardman & Vining, supra note 7, at 191-93; Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality, 
and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123, 139-46 (1972) [hereinafter Note, Legislative 
Purposes). 
14. Bertonneau v. Board of Directors of New Orleans City Schools, 3 F. Cas. 294 
(C.C.D. La. 1878) (No. 1,361); U.S. v. Buntin, 10 F. 730 (C.C.S.D. Oh. 1882). 
15. J. KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SoUTHERN PoLmCS: SUFFRAGE REsTRICTION AND 
THE EsTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SoUTH, 1880-1910 (1974); Kousser, Suffrage, in 
3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN PoLmCAL HISTORY 1236 (J. Greene ed. 1984). 
16. Essentially, the variance of the estimate of the coefficient for gender will be in-
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blacks have only recently attained much political visibility, they 
usually have difficulty raising as much money as white candidates 
do, and nearly all are Democrats, whereas most southern whites are 
now at least occasional presidential Republicans. Add such in-
dependent variables, and the effect of race on electoral success or 
polarization tends to wash out.'' Likewise, in dismissing the most 
extensive statistical study of the death penalty ever made, the fed-
eral district court in the 1987 case of McCleskey v. Kemp empha-
sized possible excluded variables and the reduction in the effects of 
race when twenty additional independent variables were added to 
the regression equation.ls But what do such equations really tell us 
about causation? What picture of the world do they represent? 
The portrait is an unreal, idealized one, in which men and wo-
men have exactly the same employment histories, express a determi-
nation to sell in precisely the same fashion, have equal knowledge of 
what has heretofore been considered by employers to be a separate 
male sphere. It is a universe where blacks are just as educated and 
wealthy as whites, in which partisanship and race are unrelated, 
and in which the effects of past discrimination all disappeared at the 
stroke of Lyndon Johnson's pen on the Voting Rights Act. It is a 
state in which race has no judicially cognizable effect on prosecutors 
or juries, even though the chances of receiving the death penalty 
just happen to be seven times as high for blacks who kill whites as 
for whites who kill blacks.'9 It is a dream world concocted in a 
computer or a witness's or judge's head for the transparent purpose 
of preventing those egalitarians fables from becoming realities, a set 
creased if variables such as experience are entered into the regression equation, if gender and 
experience are correlated. And as the variance of the estimate rises, an analyst's confidence 
that the coefficient is not zero will fall. This confidence is what the concept of statistical 
significance usually refers to in such cases. This will hold for any two (or more) variables. 
For the mathematics of the statement, see E. HANUSHEK & J. JACKSON, STATISTICAL 
METHODS FOR SOCIAL SciENTISTS 87 (1977). For unstated reasons, Judge Nordberg ac-
cepted the unusually stringent standard of a "t" value of above 3.0 for statistical significance 
in the Sears case. If there were no difference in hires or salaries by sex, one would find one in 
a sample, using this criterion, only 0.27% of the time. The combination of including vari-
ables correlated with sex and making it so difficult to find a statistically significant effect for 
sex reduces almost to zero the chance of concluding that Sears was guilty of discrimination. 
For a good commonsensical discussion of the issues involved, see Note, Title VII, Multiple 
Linear Regression Models, and the Courts: An Analysis, 46 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS., 283, 
286-88 (1983). 
17. This strategy, pioneered in voting rights cases by Professor Charles Bullock of the 
University of Georgia, has been rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court in Gingles, and by Judge 
Harold A. Baker of the Central Illinois U.S. District Court in Frank McNeil v. City of 
Springfield, Ill., 658 F. Supp. 1015 (C.D. Ill. 1987). 
18. McCleskey v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. 1756, 1764 n.6 (1987). 
19. /d. at 1770 n.20. 
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of tautological creations in which discrimination-free utopias are as-
sumed in order to prove that no discrimination took place. 
II 
The determination of the intent of the proponents of a law is 
always uncertain because of the indefiniteness of language, sloppy 
drafting, the complexity of the legislative process, the paucity of 
data on legislators' motives, imperfections in the correlations be-
tween attitudes and behavior, and multiple purposes of the actors. 
Sometimes, as Supreme Court Justice John H. Clarke once noted 
about the language of a particular statute, "it is so plain that to 
argue it would obscure it. "2o Yet even here, the difficulty of answer-
ing a question about motivation depends crucially on how broadly 
the question is phrased. If the law says that the speed limit shall not 
exceed 55 miles per hour, or that persons who use a gun during the 
commission of a felony must serve at least some time in prison, or 
that performing or conspiring to arrange an abortion is illegal, it is 
easy to identify criminal acts, but not so simple to discover why the 
legislators voted for the laws. Some may have desired to conserve 
energy, others, to prevent auto accidents; some, to inhibit violent 
crimes, others, to punish those who committed them; some, to pro-
tect the lives of fetuses, others, merely to avoid electoral challenges 
from the anti-abortionists or as part of a logrolling agreement.2I 
Even an unambiguous statute may not provide unambiguous testi-
mony on motives. The deeper motives of the legislators may be im-
portant when a judge is trying to mete out punishment or assign 
rights in cases brought under such laws, or when a plainly stated 
law fails to cover unforeseen contingencies. Judges in such in-
stances often rest their interpretations on the lawmakers' broad pur-
poses or on well-known legal principles with which they assume the 
legislators were familiar. Thus, in construing the law of wills in 
1889, New York Appeals Court Judge Robert Earl stated that "a 
thing which is within the intention of the makers of a statute is as 
much within the statute as if it were within the letter; and a thing 
which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute, 
unless it be within the intention of the makers. "22 
Inquiry into purpose may or may not be necessary to clarify a 
20. Motion Picture Co. v. Universal Film Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917), quoted in A. 
BICKEL & B. ScHMIDT, JR., THE JUDICIARY AND REsPONSIBLE GoVERNMENT 1910-21, at 
713 (1984). 
21. Long recognized by scholars, these difficulties have aroused considerable skepticism 
about the possibility of determining legislative intent at all. See Note, Legislative Purposes, 
supra note 13, at 142. 
22. Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188, 189 {1889), quoted in R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 
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statute's meaning. But when a legislative or administrative body 
adopts a regulation which has the effect of treating groups of people 
differently, and the reasonableness of the distinction or disadvan-
tage is called into question, courts usually have no alternative but to 
search for motives. Those who would confine judges entirely to the 
examination of a statute's language and effects not only needlessly 
ignore relevant information but they also launch judges on even less 
clearly demarcated, less certain seas of inquiry.23 Unless their robes 
confer mystic powers, judges must look beyond statutory language 
and to complimentary documents produced by members or employ-
ees of the relevant official body, to extrinsic materials bearing on the 
context in which the action took place, and to appropriate case law 
to determine why the officials behaved as they did.24 How can this 
be done systematically? 
A law may provide clues to its purpose and genesis on the face 
of its text, and a knowledge of other related events and of the legis-
lature's standard operating procedures may yield interpretive hints. 
In 1901, for instance, the Alabama legislature passed a law chang-
ing the Dallas County Commission from an appointive to an elec-
tive body.zs Each commissioner had to reside in one of four 
electoral districts, but all the voters in the county could cast ballots 
for every commissioner. As of 1981, when I testified in the Justice 
Department's challenge to this law in Selma-I was sixteen years 
late for the march, but things had not changed much, anyway-no 
black person had served on that black belt county's commission for 
over a century. 
I began my testimony by noting that the at-large feature of that 
local law was added to the end of the statute in a fashion that was 
barely grammatical and wholly illogical.26 In the penultimate 
clause of section 6 of the law, the winner was required to receive a 
plurality in the district, but the last clause provided that every voter 
in the county could vote for each commissioner, while remaining 
silent on what proportion of the whole electorate was necessary for 
18 (1986). See Wofford, The Blinding Light: The Uses of History in Constitutional Interpreta-
tion, 31 U. CHI. L. REv. 502, 526 (1964). 
23. Clark, Legislative Motivation and Fundamental Rights in Constitutional Law, 15 
SAN DIEGO L. REv. 953, 974-75 (1978). 
24. Thus, much of the legal scholarship on statutory interpretation, which concentrates 
on ascertaining meaning, is irrelevant to discovering purposes that may go beyond or even 
controvert apparent statutory intent. In particular, Dickerson's witty diatribe against the 
systematic use of most legislative documents, in R DICKERSON, supra note 10, at 137-97, is 
here beside the point. 
25. Act of Feb. 8, 1901, No. 328, 1900-1901 Ala. Acts 890. 
26. That such a potent inconsistency contradicts the usual presumptions about reading 
statutes (R. DICKERSON, supra note 10, at 223-25) is one of many instances that underline the 
differences in inquiries directed at meaning and those focusing on purpose. 
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election and what would happen if a commissioner carried the 
county but lost his district. When I read this to Judge W. Brevard 
Hand, who had in 1981 been considering the Dallas County voting 
case for five years, he remarked that the law was so unclear that 
someone ought to bring a legal challenge to it. The lawyer for Jus-
tice deadpanned that he thought that was what we were there for. 
Why would someone stick on an at-large voting scheme? 
The historical context helped. Dallas County had been over 
eighty percent black since the early antebellum period, and its 
elected officials during Reconstruction had been either black or 
white radical Republicans. In the late 1870s, after Alabama had 
been "redeemed," the state legislature simply abolished local elec-
tions in this and several other similar counties, obviating the need 
for violence or ballot-box stuffing to maintain white Democratic 
supremacy locally. In 1901, the Populists had been at least tempo-
rarily defeated and a constitutional convention to disfranchise 
blacks and poor whites had been authorized, but not yet convened. 
Selma Democrats felt confident enough of their ability to control 
elections to have a bill on the subject introduced. Since Alabama 
legislators customarily deferred to their colleagues on local legisla-
tion (unless, of course, those colleagues happened to be Republicans 
or Populists), the bill sailed through without reported discussion, 
amendment, or any adverse votes. Whatever it was these locals 
wanted, they got. The legislative journals and even hometown 
newspapers were silent as to the reasons for the suspicious at-large 
section.27 
Could the local notables in Selma have had anything to fear 
from blacks at the time? I concluded that they could have. Sup-
pose that the constitutional convention were to adopt a literacy test 
as the whole disfranchising device. Despite egregious educational 
discrimination, the black density in the county was so overwhelm-
ing that a small majority of the literate voters, as measured by the 
1900 census, would still be nonwhite. By mapping the electoral dis-
tricts into census districts and sampling from the manuscript census 
returns, I was able to show that two of the four county commission 
districts would have had substantial black majorities in 1900, and a 
third would have had a bare black majority, if the electorate were 
confined to literate voters. In a district system, then, with anything 
like a fairly administered literacy qualification, blacks would con-
27. Reports in the Selma Journal, a local newspaper, indicate that the at-large section 
was in the text of the bill as it was first introduced into the legislature, so the provision was 
added by the bill's initiators, and not to conform to some statewide standard imposed by 
other legislators. 
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trol half the seats. In an at-large setting, however, it would take 
only minor skulduggery, compared to what Dallas County voting 
officials had perpetrated for the last generation in state elections, to 
segregate the courthouse completely. 
It therefore seemed to me that the most plausible reason for the 
adoption of the 1901 at-large system was a racist one.zs The at-
large system provided insurance in case the convention only dis-
franchised illiterates or a widely expected lawsuit forced equitable 
enforcement of voting laws.z9 That is to say, lacking plausible di-
rect evidence, I was forced to try to reconstruct what the crucial 
actors could have foreseen, and, by adding evidence of their pur-
poses in taking other actions, to determine their motives in this in-
stance. Judge Hand disagreed with me, suggesting during the trial 
that white Selmans could not have had a racist motive in passing 
the law, because they could always have stuffed the ballot box or 
killed their opponents. What motivated them, announced the 
judge-who has more recently attracted widespread attention by 
banning school textbooks that propagate what he terms "the reli-
gion of secular humanism" -was what he considered the funda-
mental human drive-greed. It was not so much that they opposed 
blacks, as that these whites wanted all the offices for themselves. 
The court of appeals somehow managed to produce a printable re-
sponse to this reasoning, curtly overturning Judge Hand.Jo 
Reflection on this example suggests two preliminary general 
rules for investigating legislative intent. First, knowing how the 
body operated in a particular instance-who wrote the bill, how 
was it changed in committee or on the floor, whether there was a 
partisan or sectional division on it, etc.-and how the body conven-
tionally proceeded on analogous bills may indicate the importance 
of various actors in its framing. In this case, since the bill was 
passed without dissent as written by Selmans, and since the Ala-
bama legislature in this period usually deferred on purely local bills 
unless they posed some danger to white Democratic supremacy, the 
intentions that counted most were those of the Dallas county dele-
28. For an analysis of recent equal protection doctrine that focuses how central imper-
missible purposes were to an action, see Meyers, Impermissible Purposes and the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 1184, 1208 (1986). 
29. No one knew precisely what plan the convention would adopt at the time that the 
bill was proposed. Two lawsuits growing out of the convention's malpractices reached the 
U.S. Supreme Court in 1903-04. Giles v. Teasley, 193 U.S. 146 (1904); Giles v. Harris, 189 
u.s. 475 (1903). 
30. U.S. v. Dallas County Commissioner, 548 F. Supp. 875, 913-14 (S.D. Ala. 1982), 
rev'd in part and remanded, 739 F.2d 1529 (11th Cir. 1984). For fuller descriptions of Judge 
Hand's antics, see Caplan, A Good 01' Boy Sitting on The Federal Bench, L.A. Times, March 
29, 1987, at V-3. 
1988] EXPERT TESTIMONY 359 
gation. Although in some circumstances, the weighting will be ob-
vious and uncontroversial, in others, it will not be, and there, it 
must be justified openly and self-consciously.JI Second, even if 
more evidence had been available, it would still have been obviously 
fallacious to ignore the social and political context of the times and 
any available evidence about the philosophies and motives of the 
key participants. 
Few state legislatures have kept formal records of debates, 
newspaper coverage of legislative proceedings is sketchy (although 
generally less so in the nineteenth than in the twentieth century) 
and committee hearings and reports have rarely been extensive until 
rather recently. Thus, the amount of data available for uncovering 
the motives of state legislators is usually less than for an Act of 
Congress. Having less information makes it easier to come to a con-
clusion, but harder to be sure of it. On major controversial bills, if 
the historian is lucky, there will be a few partially reported 
speeches, some frustratingly vague newspaper stories and editorials, 
a roll call vote or two on amendments, and perhaps the text of the 
bill reported out by the relevant committee. If the object of atten-
tion is a bill in Congress, one will almost surely have this informa-
tion, plus hearings and reports and maybe a few mentions in private 
paper collections. For obscure or local bills, like the Dallas County 
local government act, the information will usually be much less 
plentiful. Even in the best cases, however, inference may not be 
straightforward. 32 
To see why, it is useful to introduce the concept of an issue 
space.33 To start simply, suppose that we can scale an issue from 
the most liberal to the most conservative position, or from spending 
nothing to spending, say, $1 million, or some other dimension that 
31. Compare the unfortunately offhanded justification of weights in the case of the four-
teenth amendment in Maltz, The Failure of Attacks on Constitutional Originalism, 4 CONST. 
COMM. 43, 49-50 (1987). 
32. It is easy to sympathize with Dickerson's remarks on " ... the frustrations, inter· 
minable prolixities, blind alleys, and dismal uncertainties of the prevailing patterns of legisla-
tive history." R. DICKERSON, supra note 10, at 168. For the historian or judge concerned 
with intent, however, it is impossible to take Dickerson's advice about legislative history: 
ignore it. 
33. A convenient introduction to the literature of "rational choice" is R. ABRAMS, 
FOUNDATIONS OF POLITICAL ANALYSIS (1980). I have drawn freely and without attribution 
on the standard literature on spatial models and other aspects of rational choice below. 
It might be contended that to attempt to determine the intent of a multi-member body is 
to conduct such an elementary fallacy of composition that it should simply be dismissed as 
ridiculous. If this were not enough, Kenneth Arrow's famous impossibility theorem about 
aggregating preferences provides a more formal proof of the absurdity of the effort. Nonethe-
less, lawyers and judges, must construe legislative intent to do their jobs. If we are not to 
view their effort as merely an elaborate hoax to cloak their own policy choices, then it is 
worth trying to understand how they muddle through in a non-ideal world. 
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makes sense in a particular instance. Suppose that every legislator 
has an "ideal point" or "bliss point" that represents the bill or pro-
vision that she would like to see adopted. Legislator one prefers 
point A, two prefers B, and so on. Then if there are enough legisla-
tors and enough roll calls, we may be able to determine statistically 
not only who ends up on the winning side of each, but where each 
legislator ranks on the continuum. By relating speeches to votes, 
we may be able to nail down these positions pretty precisely. Yet 
there are several difficulties and several hidden assumptions in our 
analysis. Most importantly, we have assumed, in effect, that every-
one votes and speaks "sincerely," that no strategic behavior or vote 
trading takes place. 
FIGURE I 
ONE ISSUE DIMENSION 
Lib. A 8 c Con. 
Suppose that I am one of the twenty-five percent of the legisla-
tors who takes position C, while thirty percent are at about A, and 
forty-five percent are close to B. Suppose I expect a sequence of 
votes in which B is the committee position reported out, and it is 
matched first against A and then against C. How should I vote on A 
versus B? 
FIGURE 2 
STRATEGIC VOTING IN ONE DIMENSION 
Lib. A A' 8 C' c Con. 
If I vote for the alternative nearest to my ideal point, I will 
favor B over A, and B will win by 70-30. But on the next vote, B 
will defeat C, which I prefer, by 75-25, so I end up with my second 
choice. If I vote strategically on the first ballot, A will defeat B, and 
then C will defeat A, because the people at B are closer to it than 
they are to A. So, if I vote strategically and no one else does, I will 
get an outcome (in this example) more to my liking than if I vote 
my true preferences. If everyone votes strategically, and if the 
agenda itself can be voted on, the situation immediately becomes 
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vastly more complicated and the outcome may be theoretically in-
determinate. Since legislators understood the importance of not be-
ing earnest long before the invention of game theory or spatial 
models, the bare record will often reflect strategic maneuvering and 
speaking rather than "real" intent.J4 
Legislators may have incentives not only to vote against their 
own preferences, but also to distort what they think is the content of 
each proposal. If Group A can convince Group B that A is actually 
closer to B than C is, then A may win in a sequence of roll calls. 
Group A may fool not only Group B, but may also confuse later 
judges or historians. While the bill on its face may appear to be 
close to position A, the debate may imply the contrary. What 
should one conclude in this circumstance? 
Two simplifying assumptions are often implicitly employed to 
solve this difficulty. One is that the majority's intent is concen-
trated at the position of the swing voter. We may refer to this as the 
"swing voter assumption." If C is the position finally adopted, 
then, according to this assumption, that is what the whole majority 
favored, even though we may have reason to believe that most of 
the members of the majority preferred, say, B to C The majority of 
the majority may have been inept, or the rules may have been 
stacked against it, or its members may have been so risk-averse or 
so desirous of a consensus solution that they voted for their second 
choice. Another simplifying assumption is that the members of the 
assembly said what they believed and acted as they spoke. This I 
will term the "sincere voting and speaking postulate." Legislators 
did not contend that the bill's position was at C and at the same 
time secretly hope that a future judge would construe the bill to 
have been at position C. 
In some important cases, we know not only that the swing 
voter and sincerity assumptions were incorrect, but also the direc-
tion or directions of the biases. It is often remarked, for instance, 
that opponents of a bill or argument may posit a "parade of imagi-
nary horribles" perhaps marching down a "slippery slope" as the 
inevitable direction if the bill is passed or the reasoning accepted. 
Let me give an example from the recent history of voting rights 
legislation. The key question in the renewal of the Voting Rights 
Act in the early 1980s was whether to alter section two to overrule 
the Bolden decision. To oversimplify, liberals believed that the best 
34. For game theoretic discussions of sincere and sophisticated or strategic voting, see 
Enelow, Saving Amendments, Killer Amendments, and an Expected Utility Theory ofSophisti· 
cated Voting, 43 J. PoL. 1062 (1981); Enelow & Koehler, The Amendment in Legislative 
Strategy: Sophisticated Voting in the U.S. Congress, 42 J. POL. 396 (1980). 
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indicator of whether blacks and Latinos were disadvantaged by an 
electoral arrangement was whether the candidates of their choice-
usually but not always black or Latino-were elected in proportion 
to the minority population. On a five person board in a forty per-
cent black area, for example, two of the officials should be expected 
to be black. Conservatives, led by political appointees in the Rea-
gan Justice Department, would have required proof of discrimina-
tory intent or else would have limited the Act to a guarantee that 
black or Latinos could register and vote freely. Moderates wanted 
blacks and Latinos to have a chance to be elected, but feared that a 
proportionality test would become too mechanical and absolute, 
and would discourage the sorts of coalitions that elected people like 
themselves to office. Everyone wanted credit for the passage of an 
act which by 1980 had gained almost universal rhetorical support. 
No one to the left of Jesse Helms wanted to be labeled a racist. 
The compromise that was worked out was both ingenious and 
illustrative of the points that I have been stressing. Senator Robert 
Dole offered an amendment proclaiming an effect standard, but dis-
avowing the necessity of proportional representation, and the Dem-
ocrats, particularly the ranking minority member on the Judiciary 
Committee, Edward Kennedy, allowed Dole to claim the credit for 
breaking the potential deadlock and pushing the bill toward pas-
sage. Since the compromise provision language was ambiguous, an-
cillary congressional materials assumed a heightened importance. 
In return for the credit, Dole allowed Kennedy to write the Senate 
Report on the bill, a task which he delegated to two of the chief civil 
rights lobbyists on the Act. These men not only wrote a strong 
effect standard into the report but edged towards proportionality. 
They also made sure that examples were drawn from all the legal 
cases that were either known to be pending or expected to be filed 
shortly. When a judge asked subsequently whether Congress meant 
the law to apply to a case such as that in Hopewell, Virginia, there-
fore, civil rights lawyers could simply refer him to the Senate Re-
port, which used exactly that example. Moderates got the credit, 
liberals, the gloss, but what was the single intent of Congress? 
The problem is further complicated by two other facts. Before 
the Kennedy-Dole compromise was proposed, section two had al-
ready passed the House without a specific disavowal of proportional 
representation, and the House bill had collected more than sixty 
Senate sponsors-enough to shut off a possible filibuster and nearly 
enough to override a presidential veto. Since substantial majorities 
of both houses, then, were willing to support the substitution of an 
effect for an intent criterion and to stop there, was it Congress's real 
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desire to avoid a proportionality requirement? Moreover, in a char-
acteristic display of chutzpah, the Assistant Attorney General for 
Civil Rights, William Bradford Reynolds, at least initially required 
his division to act as though section two had not been amended at 
all, and not to file cases unless the intent of the shapers of an electo-
ral system could be clearly shown to have been discriminatory.Js 
Strategize the agenda, strategize the votes, strategize the glosses, 
and let some poor judge or historian puzzle out what you wanted 
done! 
To simplify their interpretive tasks, courts have often adopted 
rules of thumb, but as the 1982 Voting Rights Act example shows, 
an announcement of such rules can further complicated matters. If 
legislators know that courts will take statements in debate by major 
sponsors or the wording of congressional reports as authoritative, 
then the political game will be extended to include those docu-
ments, and "institutional intent" will seem to be more and more an 
artificial construct. Winning not only means winning the roll calls, 
but also victory in successive judicial struggles over the interpreta-
tion of the act. It is a complicated two-stage game with incentives 
for misrepresentation in both periods. Interpretation is at the very 
least a sensitive task, and no announced interpretive scheme is strat-
egy-proof. 
These difficulties are further compounded if we model the leg-
islative situation more realistically by relaxing the assumption that 
there is only one bill, and that the bill's provisions are extremely 
simple. Suppose that in a 1 00-person legislature a bill has two pro-
visions, neither of which is supported by a majority of the members. 
But each section has rather different coalitions for and against each, 
as in Figure 3, panel A, where majorities actually oppose each pro-
vision, or panel B, where a large minority opposes, but decisive mi-
norities are indifferent. It is possible that in each case, skilled 
political entrepreneurs may be able to put together enough vote 
swaps, even without amending either section of the bill, to pass both 
provisions, as in Panel C of Figure 3. 
35. N.Y. Times, May 12, 1984, at A-9; N.Y. Times, July 27, 1985, at A-29; N.Y. Times, 
Sept. 6, 1985, at A-22; Voting Rights Review, Jan. 1987, at 2-3; Editorial, Boston Globe, 
April 13, 1987. 
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FIGURE 3 
ROLLING LOGS 
Panel A: A Preliminary Lineup with Logrolling Potential 
Provisjon R 
::m: 
ProvisionS Yea }S IS 
Nay 10 40 
Panel B: A Preliminary Lineup with Decisive Minorities Indifferent 
Provjsjon R 
Xu lnl1ili.. ::m: 
ProvisionS Yea 3S 22 OS 
Indiff. 02 03 01 
Nay OS OS 40 
Panel C: A Logroll Achieved 
Provjsjon R 
Provision S Yea Sl OS 
Nay 04 40 
The entrepreneurs' task will be facilitated if, for example, those 
who are unfavorable or indifferent or negative toward one proposal 
care more about the proposal that they favor than the one that they 
dislike. In this case, the swing voter assumption would be generally 
false, for on both provisions (or on two or more bills, in an obvious 
extension of the example) many of the swing voters were actually 
opposed or indifferent. In the presence of logrolling, then, the 
lawmakers' goals are fundamentally indeterminant. 
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Naturally, there are negative as well as positive logrolls, and 
one of the most famous examples is of the negative variety. In 
1957-58, the Warren Court came under harsh attack by an uneasy 
coalition of segregationists and fervent anticommunists. The House 
passed a bill called H.R. 3, removing the Supreme Court's jurisdic-
tion in a relatively minor class of cases, but seen by both sides as an 
entering wedge for much more substantial attacks. In a story that 
then-majority leader Lyndon B. Johnson often repeated in his effort 
to court liberals in the contest for the 1960 presidential nomination, 
the Senate vote on H.R. 3 stood at 40-40, when latecomer Robert 
Kerr of Oklahoma, who was expected to support it, stepped into the 
chamber. Johnson grabbed Kerr by the lapels and backed him into 
the Senate cloakroom, reminded him not only of past debts to LBJ, 
but also of some pending public works measures affecting 
Oklahoma that Kerr strongly favored. The great arm-twister thus 
changed Kerr's mind, thereby, as Johnson put it with his typical 
humility, singlehandedly saving the Supreme Court.36 
III 
Laws and most constitutional provisions tend to be relatively 
specific. Recent constitutional amendments setting out the proce-
dures for presidential succession, banning the poll tax, and allowing 
eighteen year-o1ds to vote come to mind. But what of the broad 
clauses that give rise to so much constitutional controversy? What 
is freedom of speech, the press, and religion? What constitutes due 
process of law? What sorts of punishment are cruel and unusual? 
What nonenumerated rights are reserved to the people? What ac-
tions deprive persons of equal protection of the laws? 
In Government by Judiciary, a book which provoked bitter con-
troversy in law journals, but which has been largely ignored by his-
torians, Raoul Berger attempted to show that the framers of the 
fourteenth amendment did not intend to outlaw segregated schools 
or malapportioned legislatures or, by implication, gender-based dis-
crimination or interference in the decision to terminate a preg-
nancy.J? Rather, the amendment was a carefully constrained 
36. Most details of this story appear in W. MURPHY, CoNGRESS AND THE CoURT 193-
223 (1962). As the example implies, logrolling may not involve simple vote trading, but also 
trade-offs with more general goals, such as friendship or indebtedness to a leader or party 
loyalty. In a parliamentary system, backbenchers or even cabinet ministers may support stat-
utes that they actually oppose out of loyalty or a disinclination to force a dissolution of the 
government. In such cases, the "true" intent behind the law cannot really be determined. 
37. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977). See Avins, De Facto and De Jure Segregation: Some 
Reflected Light on the Founeenth Amendment From the Civil Rights Act of 1875, 38 Miss. 
L.J. 179, 246-47 (1967). 
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attempt to guarantee the 1866 Civil Rights Act (which he also reads 
very narrowly) against constitutional challenge or partisan reversal. 
If Berger is right on the facts, and if constitutional provisions today 
should be interpreted to mean no more and no less than their fram-
ers intended, then the foundations of the major decisions of the 
Warren and Burger and even Rehnquist Courts are undermined. 
Brown, Baker v. Ca", Roe v. Wade, Johnson v. Santa Clara, and 
many more decisions represent not good law, but mere judicial 
overreaching.Js In a pair of 1985 speeches that attracted wide-
spread attention, Attorney General Edwin Meese, III and Supreme 
Court Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. engaged in a heated exchange 
that seems to portend an extended public debate on the issues raised 
by Berger, his allies, and their critics.J9 President Reagan's unsuc-
cessful nomination to the Supreme Court of Robert H. Bork further 
underlined the crucial nature of the controversy. 
Berger's detractors have taken two basic tacks. The first ac-
cepts or sidesteps his reading of the intent of the framers, but dis-
misses his interpretive premise that the meaning of broad 
constitutional sections should be cabined by the views of men of one 
or two centuries ago.40 This view is particularly strong among 
those who would extend constitutional protections to groups that 
clearly were not envisaged by Reconstruction legislators, such as 
gays, women, and welfare recipients.4t The second, and less trav-
elled, path is to question Berger's account of the framers' inten-
tions.42 By closely analyzing Berger's account, however, I shall 
38. Johnson v. Santa Clara, 107 S. Ct. 1442 (1987); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); 
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
39. W. Brennan, Speech at Georgetown University 4-5 (Oct. 12, 1985) (mimeo); E. 
Meese, Speech before American Bar Association, 13-17 (July 9, 1985) (mimeo). 
40. E.g., R. DwoRKIN, supra note 22, at 360-63; Alfange, On Judicial Po/icymaking 
and Constitutional Change: Another Look at the "Original Intent" Theory of Constitutional 
Interpretation, 5 HAsT. CoNST. L.Q. 603 (1978); Bridwell, Book Review, 1978 DUKE L.J. 
907; Gangi, Judicial Expansionism: An Evaluation of the Ongoing Debate, 8 OHIO N.U.L. 
REv. 1 (1981); Lynch, Book Review, 63 CoRNELL L. REv. 1091 (1978); Munzer & Nickel, 
Does The Constitution Mean What It A./ways Meant?, 77 CoLUM. L. REv. 1029, 1032 (1977); 
Perry, InterpretiYism, Freedom of Expression. and Equal Protection, OHIO ST. L.J. 261, 270, 
285, 292-97 (1981); Simon, The Authority of the Framers of the Constitution: Con Originalist 
Interpretation Be Justified?, 73 CALIF. L REv. 1482 (1985); Tushnet, Following the Rules 
Laid Down: A. Critique of Interpreti-,ism and Neutral Principles, 96 HAR.v. L. REv. 781, 800-
01 (1983). The clearest and most persuasive statement is Brest, The Misconcei-,ed Quest for 
the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REv. 204 (1980). 
41. Whether these critics seek other criteria because they find Berger's arguments con-
vincing, or accept Berger too casually (in my view) because they want to argue for using other 
modes of interpretation is unclear, at least to me. Whatever the critics' intentions, I think 
they have failed to realize the weaknesses of Berger's specific arguments about the original 
understanding of the fourteenth amendment. 
42. See Curtis, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights, 14 CoNN. L. REv. 
237 (1982); Curtis, The Bill of Rights as a Limitation on State A.uthon'ty: A. Reply to Professor 
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attempt to show that the two strategies do not differ as much as 
might be imagined. 
Berger adopts at least eight rules or empirical generalizations 
to simplify his interpretive task, none of which is uncontroversial 
and all of which bias his conclusions. Every interpretation, as Ron-
ald Dworkin points out, rests on value-laden principles. The Consti-
tution nowhere states that judges, executives, or legislators must 
discover and abide by the applications of broad principles to specific 
situations that the framers may (or may not) have had in mind a 
century or two ago. 43 
The first of Berger's principles I will call the "floor of Con-
gress" rule-only recorded debates in Congress are probative.44 
This, of course, conveniently limits the evidence that one has to ex-
amine, but it leaves out contemporary letters, newspaper stories, 
speeches, and ratification debates in state legislatures, as well as pre-
vious documents of all kinds that may illuminate doctrinal develop-
ments that led to the amendment, and actions or statements after 
1866 that cast reflected light on the motives and meanings of the 
sponsors. 45 Even if Berger had not read silence as acquiescence and 
quoted from speeches very selectively, the rule would bias conclu-
sions unless floor comments are a representative sample of all opin-
ions, whether those opinions are officially expressed or not. Since 
large numbers of congressmen, state legislators, and campaigners, 
Berger, 16 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 45 (1980); Kutler, Raoul Berger's 14th Amendment: A 
History or Ahistorical?, 6 HASTINGS CoNST. L.Q. 511 (1979); Mendelson, A Note on the 
Cause and Cure of the 14th Amendment, 43 J. PoL 152 (1981); Murphy, Constitutional Inter-
pretation: The Art of the Historian, Magician, or Statesman?, 87 YALE L.J. 1752 (1978); 
Soifer, Protecting Civil Rights: A Critique of Raoul Berger's History, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 651 
(1979). 
43. R. DWORKIN, A MAlTER OF PRINCIPLE 52-55, 165 (1985). See also Tushnet, 
supra note 40, at 784-96. Legal commentators such as Berger who urge the adoption of 
certain maxims of constitutional exegesis and conventions for determining intent do not elim-
inate normative behavior by judges or historians, as they claim to do. Lyons, Constitutional 
Interpretation and Original Meaning, 4 Soc. PHIL. & PoL'Y 75 (1986). Those theorists 
merely believe that choices should be made at the level of interpretive principles, rather than 
on matters of substantive policy, and they implicitly assert that those standards are neutral, 
and that they are chosen independently of substantive outcomes, as though they took place 
behind a Rawlsian "veil of ignorance." ]. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136-42 (1971). 
If they do not, if the implications or adhering to a particular rule or interpretive formula 
can be largely if perhaps imperfectly foreseen, then any rigid distinction between choosing 
rules and choosing policies dissolves. In the instance before us, it is hard to imagine that 
Berger's muddled, often self-contradictory, law-office history was cooked up without a con-
sideration of its present-day consequences, and utterly ludicrous to maintain that endorse-
ments of his position by such persons as Attorney General Edwin Meese were. 
44. R. BERGER, supra note 37, at 6-7. 
45. ]. KOUSSER, DEAD END, supra note 12; R. DWORKIN, supra note 43, at 43-48; J. 
TEN BROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW (1965); Bennett, "Mere" Rationality in Constitutional 
Law: Judicial Review and Democratic Theory, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 1049, 1091 (1979); Mur-
phy, supra note 42, at 1755. 
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especially the more radical among them, said very little about sec-
tion one during the debates, it seems unlikely that the Congressional 
Record is representative.46 
Berger's second rule is what I have called above the "swing 
voter assumption" -Congress is taken to have enacted the bliss 
point of that legislator who is just on the margin between voting for 
or against the proposal. All members whose ideal points are to his 
right, say, vote "nay," while others would prefer more leftist pro-
posals, but capitulate because without the swing person or group 
they would lose. 
Closely related is Berger's third assumption, sincere behav-
ior.47 If some legislators vote or abstain strategically, then no single 
person or group is pivotal, and therefore no position in an issue 
space is. Suppose that there is a minimal majority rule in effect, for 
instance, a provision that a constitutional amendment must obtain 
two-thirds of the votes in both houses of Congress, and that opinion 














EXTREMISTS CAN BE SWING VOTERS 
R B M T D Racist 
In this graph, the vertical axis measures the number of people 
taking a certain position, and the three clumps of people have 
modes at "R" (for Radical Republicans), M (for Moderate Republi-
cans), and D (for Democrats). There are more moderates than any-
thing else, and Berger assumes, therefore, that the final position 
adopted will be at about M or even to the right, at T (for two-
thirds). But suppose that the R's indicate in public or private that 
they will either vote against M and T or abstain. Then they may be 
46. Soifer, supra note 42, at 682. 
47. R. BERGER, supra note 37, at 116, 241. 
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able to convince the other Republicans to favor B (for John A. 
Bingham, who is usually considered the most important framer), as 
against D, which amounts to no change at all. Since abstention and 
strategic voting were rife in the 39th Congress, any political entre-
preneur would anticipate the possibility and frame his proposals to 
minimize strategic defections. 48 Since most of the drafting of sec-
tion one necessarily went on mostly in private, and since much of 
the floor strategy was thrashed out in private Republican caucuses, 
the possibility that the meaning of the amendment did not coincide 
with the moderate swing voters' position certainly cannot be ruled 
out.49 
While he assumes that the proponents of the amendment were 
simplemindedly sincere, Berger considers the Democrats strategic 
liars. He views as buncombe their claims that the measure would 
force the abrogation of school segregation and antimiscegenation 
laws and would empower the central government to protect all the 
rights of persons against the states. so Not only are Berger's remarks 
about each side's craftiness incongruous, but his characterization 
also implies a breadth and vagueness in the amendment that was 
necessary for the Democratic charges to have any credibility what-
soever. Yet such breadth would go counter to a fifth Berger predis-
position-to consider the fourteenth amendment a point estimate, 
or, to put it in Dworkin's terms, an effort to legislate a "concrete," 
rather than a less specific "abstract" intent.si Scholars have often 
frustratedly remarked that most of the debate by advocates of sec-
tion one was conducted in sonorous references to Magna Carta, the 
Declaration of Independence, and the protection of freedmen and 
southern white loyalists.s2 But should a debate about the most ex-
pansively phrased constitutional provision after 1791 have been fo-
cused on details of the moment, as if Congress were discussing petty 
48. As Earl M. Maltz points out, radicals joined Democrats to defeat an early version 
of the reduction-of-representation section of the fourteenth amendment. Thus, uncompro-
mising supporters and uncompromising opponents of black su1frage refused to accept a mid-
dle way. Maltz, The Fourteenth Amendment as Political Compromise-Section One in the 
Joint Committee on Reconstruction, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 933, 942 (1984). For further examples 
of such behavior, see D. DoNALD, THE PoLmCS OF REcONSTRUCTION, 1863-1867 (1965). 
49. Mendelson, supra note 42, at 154-56; Farber & Muench, The Ideological Origins of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, l CoNST. CoMM. 235, 273-74 (1984). 
50. For a discussion of Representative Andrew Rogers's (D, N.J.) statement charging 
that both the 1866 Civil Rights Bill and the fourteenth amendment would outlaw segregated 
schools, see Kelly, The Fourteenth Amendment Reconsidered: The Segregation Question, 54 
MICH. L. REV. 1049, 1066-67, 1074 (1956). For Berger's views on the untrustworthiness of 
Democratic statements, seeR. BERGER, supra note 37, at 157-65. 
51. R. DWORKIN, supra note 43, at 48-57. 
52. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. 
REv. I, 56-59 (1955); Farber & Muench, supra note 49, at 269; Kelly, supra note 50, at 1077. 
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and easily altered regulations, such as a tariff list, a rivers and 
harbors appropriation bill, or retiring greenbacks? Additionally, in 
a more practical sense, one of the chief tactics employed to hold any 
coalition together is ambiguity. If the amendment and the discus-
sion on it were deliberately kept broad and vague in order to hold 
the Republicans together against a defecting president and a still 
possibly potent, unreconstructedly racist Democratic opposition, 
does it make sense to treat the amendment as a shorthand for a 
specific laundry list of positions on schools, suffrage, etc.?s3 
Berger also assumes attitude stability in three senses: First, the 
white northern public was, in his eyes, ineradicably and deeply ra-
cist and opposed to the centralization of power in the national gov-
ernment. This allows him to use statements from the antebellum 
era as evidence about feelings in 1866, to shove the abolitionists and 
their heirs offstage as a tiny minority, and to contend that all Re-
publican politicians must have been terrified of taking liberal posi-
tions on racial matters, so that the Civil Rights Bill of 1866 and the 
fourteenth amendment must have been "conservative" measures.s4 
Second, because he presumes that individuals never change, state-
ments at any time in their careers evidence their views in 1866, and 
none of the events of that "critical year" moved them.ss Third, he 
assumes that a "moderate" or a "conservative" position is constant 
in relation to some timeless scale. If the scale itself is in motion-if, 
for instance, black suffrage was a "radical" measure for Republi-
cans in 1866, but a "mainstream" one by 1869, or if people shifted 
from faction to faction-then Berger's general argument, which 
identifies issue positions by their factional sponsorship, is under-
mined.s6 The argument is also both vague and circular. His strat-
egy is to identify people with factions by informally and 
unsystematically lining them upon crucial issues, and then to de-
nominate any proposal made by a member of one of these "fac-
tions" with that position in some eternal issue space. Thus, a 
"moderate" is someone who votes with other "moderates," and 
anything that he proposes or votes for is, by definition, "moder-
53. Kelly, supra note 50, at 1071, 1084; Bickel, supra note 52, at 61-63. Charles Sum-
ner, the protege of Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story who succeeded Story as Professor at 
Harvard Law, and George F. Edmunds, for twenty years head of the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee, stated in 1869 that the fourteenth amendment by itself enfranchised blacks. See l J. 
STORY, CoMMENTARIES ON THE CoNSTITUTION 686 (T. Cooley 4th ed. 1873). 
54. R. BERGER, supra note 37, at 10-16, 56-57, 85, 161, 407. 
55. Mendelson, supra note 42, 158 n.34; R. BERGER, supra note 37, at 91. 
56. For evidence of the shift of the issue space see Kaczorowski, To Begin The Nation 
Anew: Congress, Citizenship, and Civil Rights After the Civil War, 92 AM. HIST. REV. 45, 49 
(1987). For evidence of factional fluidity, see A. BoQuE, THE EARNEST MEN: R.E.PUBLI-" 
CANS OF THE CIVIL WAR SENATE 104-05 (1981). 
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ate."s7 Furthermore, Berger's assumption of individual and societal 
stasis, if ever an appropriate simplification, is surely inapplicable to 
the years of the growth of antislavery sentiment, the Civil War, 
emancipation, and the brutal ideological and social conflicts of the 
Reconstruction period. 
A seventh postulate is that key words and phrases had tempo-
rally constant, knife-edge sharp, universally recognized defini-
tions.ss "Liberty" meant only what Blackstone had said it was-
freedom of locomotion-a hundred years earlier.s9 All the patriotic 
and campaign oratory and all the antislavery campaign's books, 
pamphlets, and newspaper articles did not, in Berger's view, encrust 
the word with any additional significance. 60 By "due process," the 
fourteenth amendment's sponsors referred only to procedure, not 
substance, according to Berger, as though there were a "bright line" 
between the two and as though no antebellum natural rights-sub-
stantive due process tradition existed.6t By "privileges or immuni-
ties," they signaled only their adherence to Justice Bushrod 
Washington's 1823 musings on the article IV privileges or immuni-
ties clause, even though in almost the only mention of the point 
during the printed debates, the fourteenth amendment's Senate 
manager, Jacob Howard, specifically disavowed any intention to 
limit the clause to Justice Washington's enumeration.62 By "equal 
protection," they evinced a desire to protect only those particular 
rights that they had enumerated in the 1866 Civil Rights Act, an act 
57. Maltz, who also argues for a relatively conservative reading of the fourteenth 
amendment, provides a particularly succinct example of such reasoning: "The voting pattern 
on the Bingham substitute clearly reflects the Moderate origin of the current language of 
section one [of the 14th Amendment]. The more Moderate and Conservative elements of the 
Uoint] Committee [on Reconstruction] were virtually unanimous in their support of the pro-
posal. Among this group only Grimes dissented. One would hardly expect such near una-
nimity unless the proposal softened the language of section one." Maltz, supra note 48, at 
963. The capitalization of factional labels presumably heightens the reader's sense of their 
reality. 
58. R. BERGER, supra note 37, at 134-56, 194-95, 200, 243. Cf Bickel, supra note 52, at 
34-35 ("Sir, I defy any man upon the other side of the House to name to me any right of the 
citizen which is not included in the worlds 'life, liberty, privileges, and immunities,' unless it 
should be the right of suffrage." (quoting the statement of A.J. Rogers (D. N.J.))). 
59. R. BERGER, supra note 37, at 20-21, 34-35, 243, 270. 
60. In an 1844 pamphlet, for instance, the abolitionist William Godell had defined the 
"liberty" of the fifth amendment due process clause as "the power of acting as one thinks fit, 
without restraint or control except from the laws of nature." Quoted in 1. TEN BROEK, supra 
note 45, at 75. For a summary of the use of the term "liberty" in the debates over the 
thirteenth amendment, see id at 167-68. 
61. R. BERGER, supra note 34, at 139-40, 193-214. Cf Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 
393 (1856); Wynehamer v. The People, 13 N.Y. 378 (1856); J. TEN BROEK, supra note 45. 
For an excellent critique of the substance/process distinction, see L. TRIBE, supra note 10, at 
9-20. 
62. Mendelson, supra note 42, at 154-55; Farber & Muench, supra note 49, at 274. 
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that Berger, unlike the Supreme Court and other scholars, reads 
very narrowly.63 All of these presumptions serve Berger's evident 
purpose-to eliminate national protection of the rights of the disad-
vantaged-and there is little or no evidence for any of them. 
Finally, Berger believes that white racial attitudes form a tem-
porally stable Guttman-type scale, from allowing racial intermar-
riage on one end through school and jury integration, black 
suffrage, the right to hold office, and protection against racially-mo-
tivated violence, all the way to the "Black codes" and slavery on the 
other end. 64 In such a hierarchical scale, anyone who disavowed 
black suffrage, for example, must, to be consistent, also have op-
posed any policy to its left-for instance, school integration, as in 
Figure 5. If attitudes did form such a scale, if he has properly or-
dered it, and if no other factors affected people's votes on these is-
sues, then Berger is justified in using evidence that Republicans did 
not force the suffrage issue in 1866 as support for his view that they 
did not intend to mandate school integration, outlaw antimis-
cegenation statutes, etc. 
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All three of these conditionals seem to me wrong. People may 
be much more willing to allow such private, voluntary, nonextemal-
ity producing acts as the choice of a marriage partner to be free of 
restrictions than they are to favor obligatory racial contacts that 
might directly involve everyone in schools or stores. Democrats 
63. R. BERGER, supra note 37, at 171. For a much broader, and, I think, more convinc-
ing reading, see J. TEN BROEK, supra note 45, at 179-81. 
64. R. BERGER, supra note 37, at 123, 174, 239, 243 n.54, 412. 
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with few expectations of capturing black votes might more vehe-
mently oppose impartial suffrage than school segregation. Since 
other attitudes and interests affect white positions on racial matters, 
and everyone may not order the scales similarly, this last Berger 
assumption is just as dubious as its predecessors.6s 
The determination of intent will never be either easy or uncon-
troversial, but historians will be stuck with the problem so long as 
we keep asking "why?" and judges and lawyers, so long as there are 
statutes and constitutions to be construed. So far as I know, there is 
no general algorithm for discovering purposes, but the quest need 
not be an "unfocused hunting expedition. "66 Uninstructed "com-
mon sense" is frequently misleading. In this as in other instances, 
perhaps the best guidance is the most basic: do not assume that 
your subjects are simple or stupid; be conscious of your methods 
and biases; put your thesis at risk; and do not unwittingly adopt 
theoretical or evidentiary rules that decide the case for you. How-
ever obvious, these rules are too seldom strictly adhered to, and it 
never hurts to remind oneself and others of them-so that we may 
all live up to our good intentions. 
65. Maltz, supra note 48, at 947, 950 n.75, 961, contends that Reconstruction Republi· 
can congressmen's votes did not always reflect their true preferences because of "political 
expediency," "the pressures" of "events," or "the need to preserve this newly found unity." 
66. Note, Segregative Intent, supra note II, at 325. 
